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Introduction
In case of Turkey its interests in Cyprus date back to the 16th century when armies of
Sultan Selim II managed to conquer the island and incorporate it in the Ottoman Em-
pire. As a result, in practice Cyprus had been under the Turkish rule until 1878 when the
British took control over the island on the basis of a British-Ottoman treaty. From the
legal point of view, however, the period of Ottoman domination finished on the basis of
the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.
After Turks had lost Cyprus for good in 1923 they were not interested in it anymore.
At least officially. Despite the fact that they still supported Turkish Cypriots, Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk did not intend to gain control over the island at the cost of good relations
with the United Kingdom and Greece. The situation changed when it became clear that
Greek Cypriots did not want to end their struggle for the unification of Cyprus and
Greece, namely enosis.
The Cyprus question has remained one of the most complicated international dis-
putes since 1963.1 It was the year when the Republic of Cyprus de facto ceased to exist
as a kind of consociational federation. It was a consequence of the intercommunal
clashes between 1963–1964 and defeats of Turkish Cypriots. These events caused
a kind of national trauma. It was clear that Turkish Cypriots were defenseless without
any military and political support of Turkey. Moreover, the Cyprus question became
a matter of national interest for Turks. Vamik Volcan claims that “when Turks speak or
write about the Cyprus problem they go back to 1963 and recount their horror story
when the Greek Cypriots, who outnumbered Cypriot Turks four to one, forced the Cyp-
riot Turks to live in subhuman conditions in enclaves geographically limited to three
percent of the island. They lived this way, surrounded by their enemies, for eleven
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years” (Volkan 2008, p. 95). Yet it should be made clear that Greek Cypriots do not
share this opinion. Moreover, they claim that such events did not take place and these
were Greek Cypriots who became victims of the Turkish invasion of 1974. Conse-
quently, in their opinion the dispute began in 1974, not in 1963.
Although in 50 years there were dozens of peace initiatives all of them were unsuc-
cessful. Harriet Martin rightly points out that “Cyprus has the reputation as a mediator’s
graveyard and it is easy to see why” (Martin 2006, p. 30). The Cyprus question is not
important only to members of both Cypriot communities, namely Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots, but also to Greeks, Turks and the British. There are a few reasons for
that including historical background, security issues as well as ethnic composition. In
case of Turkey, the Cyprus question is also a matter of national interest.
The article represents a comparative approach. It is dedicated to an analysis of the
Turkish foreign policy towards the Cyprus question since 1974, namely after the Turk-
ish military intervention. The given period covers almost 40 years therefore attention is
paid to the most significant moments as well as general positions of various Turkish
governments on the Cyprus question. The main aim is to determine elements of conti-
nuity as well as elements of change within the Turkish position on the dispute. In order
to achieve this goal the article has been divided into three main parts, namely (1) histor-
ical background, (2) the period between 1974–2002 and finally (3) the period of the
Peace and Justice (AKP) rule in Turkey.
A Brief Historical Overview: The Attitude of Turkey Towards
the Cyprus Question Before 1974
The more Greek Cypriots insisted on the unification of Cyprus with Greece, the
more Turkey was interested in developments on the island and its future status. The
British rule did not pose any threat to Turkey’s security. The situation would have
changed dramatically if Cyprus had been ceded to Greece. Hence Turkey was deter-
mined to react and present its own concept. In the opinion of Sina Akºin, “Turkey had
initially laid claim to the whole of Cyprus (with the slogan ‘Cyprus is Turkish and will
stay Turkish’), but after reassessment it was decided that this was unrealistic and a new
demand arose” (Akºin 2007, p. 257). As a result, starting from the mid-50’s Turkey
opted for a division of the island’s territory between Greece and Turkey. Turks intro-
duced even their own term, taksim, to counterbalance the Greek concept, i.e. enosis. Yet
none of the above plans was accomplished. In 1959 Greece, Turkey, the United King-
dom as well as representatives of both Cypriot communities made a compromise con-
cerning the future of Cyprus. During the conferences in Zürich and in London all sides
agreed on the foundation of an independent Cypriot state. As a result, the Republic of
Cyprus was founded in 1960 and Turkey became one out of three guarantors of the con-
stitutional order on the island. Turkey’s rights were confirmed in the Treaty of Guaran-
tee of 1960 (Treaty, 2003). Moreover, on the basis of the Additional Protocol No. 1 to
the Treaty of Alliance of 1960 Turkey was allowed to maintain up to 650 soldiers on the
island. They were to counterbalance the presence of the Greek contingent, namely 950
Greek soldiers (Additional, 2003, p. 136).
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Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the two Cypriot communities were not pre-
pared for cooperation and had different opinions with regard to security issues, power
sharing, taxation and the so-called municipal issue. First these differences had led to
a constitutional crisis and then resulted in the intercommunal clashes between 1963–64.
Although Turkey backed Turkish Cypriots, it did not decide to intervene militarily this
time except for a few air raids (Oberling 1982, p. 119). Turkish Cypriots left all public
posts and were forced to live in a number of small enclaves scattered all over the island.
As living conditions in the enclaves were very bad, Turkey was helping Turkish Cypri-
ots within bounds of possibility. Simultaneously, Turks engaged in a diplomatic cam-
paign in order to support Turkish Cypriots. Despite that, another crisis on the island
took place in 1967. According to Cihat Göktepe “the 1967 Cyprus crisis brought both
Turkey and Greece to the edge of war. Turkey was determined to send troops to the is-
land with the intention to protect her interests and the security of Turkish Cypriots. This
problem was solved in a peaceful way. The Americans were very active in this process”
(Göktepe 2005, p. 441). But unsettled disputes remain unsettled disputes. The interven-
tion had taken place neither in 1964 nor in 1967, but in 1974 it was simply unavoidable.
And there were a few reasons for that.
The successful coup d’état of the Greek Cypriot right of 15 July 1974 radically
changed the situation on the island. Turkey had two options. The first one was con-
nected with diplomatic efforts, while the second meant a military intervention. It was
not a secret that the Turkish armed forces were well prepared for such scenario. First
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit decided to search for a peaceful solution in the UK, albeit
the army was ready for landing. When diplomatic talks did not meet Turkey’s expecta-
tions, the Turkish government decided to authorize the beginning of the military opera-
tion on 20 July.
Umut Uzer rightly pointed out that “the 1974 intervention in Cyprus was a case of
the military and the government coordinating their policies in a diligent manner. In
fact, because there had been indirect military rule in the years between 1971 and
1973, which had exposed the army to the game of politics and left it with little taste for
it thereafter, the military was reluctant to influence governmental policies. The suc-
cessful conclusion of the Cyprus debacle increased the military establishment’s con-
fidence in the Ecevit government in particular and in civilian rule in general” (Uzer
2011, p. 78).
Although the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was condemned by the inter-
national community especially the United Nations Security Council, the Turkish
authorities claimed that they had no other choice but to intervene. The Turkish govern-
ment’s priority was to protect the Turkish Cypriot community at any cost. The then
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit never changed his opinion about legitimacy of the 1974
military operation. In 2000, in an interview with Johann Pillai, Ecevit said: “But Turkey
– we – cannot give up our national rights… and we keep reminding our European
friends that there is no real problem on the island; on the contrary, before the present
setup was established in 1974, there was continuous bloodshed on the island, either in
the form of genocidal attacks against the Turks, or as conflicts between Greek factions.
But since mid-1974, mid-August 1974, there has existed complete, uninterrupted peace
on the island for the first time” (Pillai, 2000, p. 21).
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Turkey and Its Position on the Cyprus Question Between 1974–2002
One of the consequences of the intervention has been a de facto division of the is-
land. De iure exists only one Cypriot state, namely the Republic of Cyprus, however, de
facto there are two of them. In November 1983 Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared
independence and foundation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). So
far the new realities on the island have been recognized only by Turkey which main-
tains diplomatic relations with the TRNC. Turkey is also burdened with the Turkish
Cypriot budget. Annually Turkey guarantees and transfers money which covers around
a half of the TRNC’s budget.
According to Philip Robins, in the 90’s the Cyprus question became the most impor-
tant issue of the Turkish foreign policy. He claimed that the general lack of public mobi-
lization, for instance, “in the Bosnian case was hardly surprising given the elite
orientation of foreign policy in Turkey, and the absence of issues other than Cyprus that
animate the wider population” (Robins, 2003, p. 369). In the given period the Cyprus
question was also important as an element of the Greek-Turkish relations. Tensions be-
tween Athens and Ankara made quite an impact on the situation on the island.
Besides, the unsettled Cyprus problem also determined EU-Turkey relations. “The
irritations on both sides reached a high-point in 1997. After the EU had yet again urged
Turkey to find a solution to the Cyprus question, to improve its human rights record and
to ameliorate conditions in Kurdish areas, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs
[Tansu] Çiller threatened to block the NATO membership of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic unless Turkey was also given the status of candidate-member of the
EU” (Brusse, Griffiths 2004, p. 23–24).
At that time the Turkish position meant unconditional support for Turkish Cypriots
especially for the then President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Rauf
Denktaº. Until 2002 Turkish governments did not intend to compromise their stances
on the Cyprus question for the sake of being accepted by the European Union. More-
over, some Turkish politicians blamed both the European Union and Greek Cypriots for
a stalemate in the intercommunal negotiation process at the turn of the century. The rea-
son was the opening of accession talks between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus,
namely only with the Greek Cypriot side. Turkey was afraid that Turkish Cypriots
would become marginalized. Besides, once the Republic of Cyprus became an EU
member state, it would be able to block the potential accession process of Turkey. One
of these politicians was Ismail Cem, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey,
who in 1996 forewarned against consequences of a possible accession of the Republic
of Cyprus to the European Union. In one of his speeches Cem stated as follows: “Greek
Cypriots are quite satisfied with the status quo. They are encouraged by the European
Union, which admitted them as a ‘candidate’ for accession. They think that sooner or
later they will become a member and have the advantage of making integral part to
a powerful union. Then, they figure, they will be in a much stronger position to dictate
their will to Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, they do not want any change, they are not after
a mutually acceptable solution, and they just want the time to run by” (Cem, 2001, p. 143).
In 2000 Wojciech Forysiñski wrote: “There are two other political conditions for
Turkey which go beyond the Copenhagen criteria, or at least beyond the normal under-
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standing of the Copenhagen criteria. These are the Cyprus question and settlement of
outstanding border disputes” (Forysiñski, 2000, p. 200). In addition he underlined that
Turkey seemed to have no intention to change its position on Cyprus and maintained
that the European Union’s policy did not in any way enhance the chances of a settle-
ment. It made it only more difficult to achieve (Forysiñski, 2000, p. 201). Undoubtedly,
such assessment was right at that time. One could say a lot about the Turkish foreign
policy towards Cyprus between 1974–2002, but not that it was flexible or conciliatory.
Nonetheless, at the very beginning of the 21st century some Turkish politicians under-
stood the necessity of a realignment of the Turkish foreign policy. Among them were
future leaders Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoðlu. The out-
look of the last of them was of primary meaning.
The Reorientation in the Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Rule:
Implications for the Cyprus Question
The Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes since November
2002 when the Peace and Justice Party (AKP) came into power in Turkey. The Copen-
hagen Summit of December 2002 “showed clearly that the possibility of Turkey’s ac-
cession to Europe depends on the resolution of the Cyprus conflict” (Keyman, Öniº,
2007, p. 172). Yet it was easy to say, hard to conduct. Nonetheless, the AKP govern-
ment was determined to conduct such changes. Recep Tayyip Erdoðan publicly stated,
“as an indication of his determination to solve the Cyprus problem, that Turkey would
be always one step ahead in coming up with proposals so as to find breakthroughs in the
resolution of the problems” (Kibaroðlu and Kibaroðlu, 2009, 144). The opposition
harshly criticized the new government for such fundamental changes. At the same time
AKP presented such shift as an outcome of rational choice and an example of pragma-
tism. This way the government intended to get rid of ideological limitations especially
of nationalistic nature which had been promoted before, for instance, by the army and
kemalists.
A Turkish scholar and politician, Ahmet Davutoðlu, became the main author of
a new concept of foreign policy. His views and the concept of so-called strategic depth
were first presented in the book entitled ‘Startejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararas?
konumu’ (Davutoðlu, 2012). One of the most important elements of the new foreign
policy was connected with a new concept, namely zero problems with neighbours pol-
icy. Its main aspect was elimination of all disputes and normalization of bilateral rela-
tions with all neighbouring countries including Cyprus.
The change of position on the Cyprus question seemed to be necessary in order to
facilitate dialogue with the European Union and open accession negotiations. It was al-
most certain that any continuation of the hard line meant no progress. Although AKP
was in favour of such change, such stance was being criticized by other parties. For in-
stance, Mümtaz Soysal, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, wrote in one
of his articles: “I am not against a solution to the Cyprus Problem. But we should insist
on a solution that neither suppresses the Turkish population nor disregards Turkey’s
rights as a guarantor state and its legitimate concerns over the island. It is unacceptable
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to grant England the right to have a military base on Cyprus and deny Turkey the right
to protect her interests by military means if necessary. This is not an acceptable solu-
tion. Therefore, when we sit at the negotiating table with our European counterparts, we
should stand up for our neglected rights and prerogatives” (Soysal, 2002, p. 351).
From the beginning of the AKP rule in Turkey it was clear that Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktaº lost unconditional political support of Ankara. He could, however,
still count on the army and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Unfortunately, as a hard-liner,
Denktaº had nothing new to offer and became a kind of burden for the new foreign pol-
icy of Turkey. Undoubtedly, it was one of the reasons for supporting Mehmet Ali Talat
and his Republican Turkish Party during the parliamentary elections in the TRNC in
December 2003. This way Recep Tayyip Erdoðan intended to present a conciliatory
gesture, resume intercommunal talks and, as a result, remove the biggest obstacle in
EU-Turkey relations. The later resumption of talks and the April 2004 referenda in Cy-
prus only proved that Erdoðan’s tactic was right. Although the so-called Annan Plan
had not been approved by both Cypriot communities, Turkey was praised for its con-
structive approach towards the Cyprus question. The Turkish government had encour-
aged Turkish Cypriots to accept the plan and it was the Greek Cypriot side which turned
it down. In terms of public relations, the 2004 referenda were meant a big success of
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. One may even say that it was one of the
main reasons for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.
Yet the new tactic appeared to be only partially successful. Turkey also demanded
lifting the de facto isolation of northern Cyprus. The isolation is both political and eco-
nomic. It became tiresome especially after the foundation of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus in 1983. Top Turkish politicians kept supporting Turkish Cypriots and
criticizing the EU at the same time. For example, Egemen Baðýº, the Turkish Minister
for European Union and Chief Negotiator, wrote: “On Cyprus, we expect EU member
states to act in full awareness of their commitments. The Council decision of April 26,
2004, regarding lifting the isolation of northern Cyprus has not yet been implemented.
The direct trade regulation has not been adopted. It is particularly sad that Turkish-EU
relations should be held hostage by a single member’s selfish interest. It is unfortunate
that large member states are hiding behind the island” (Baðýº 2011, p. 34).
In 2006 Turkey presented its own peace initiative known as the Action Plan. Its
main assumptions were outlined by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül.
These were:
– “Opening of the sea ports of Turkey to Greek Cypriot vessels serving the trade of
goods in accordance with the EC-Turkey Customs Union;
– Allowing Greek Cypriot air carriers to use the Turkish air space for over-flights and
to land at the Turkish airports in accordance with relevant international rules and pro-
cedures;
– Opening of the ports in North Cyprus, including Gazimaðusa, Girne, and Gemikonaðý to
international traffic of goods, persons and services under Turkish Cypriot management;
– Opening of Ercan airport for direct flights under the Turkish Cypriot management;
– Special arrangements for the practical inclusion of North Cyprus, as an economic en-
tity, into the European Union’s customs union. Unhindered direct trade between both
sides of the Island as well as with the outside world;
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– Participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in international sports, cultural and other so-
cial activities” (Gül 2006).
The above initiative was not implemented, however, it was a clear sign of goodwill
and readiness for cooperation. Again lack of trust became the main reason for the fail-
ure of the Action Plan. The Greek Cypriot community was afraid of lifting the restric-
tions imposed on Turkish Cypriots. The authorities of the Republic of Cyprus claimed
that if they allowed, for example, to open the ports and airports in ‘the occupied territo-
ries’, Turkish Cypriots would lose motivation to resume bilateral talks. Moreover,
Greek Cypriots would gain almost nothing, but they would be forced to change their at-
titude towards the Cyprus question completely. It should be emphasized that such
claims were partially true, because the Action Plan was not well balanced and offered
Turkish Cypriots much more than Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless, the plan still represents
a good example of expectations of the Turkish side. It’s a kind of minimum plan to be
achieved by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in a course of any bilateral negotiations.
The AKP government supports the ongoing negotiation process on the island which
was initiated in 2008. Turkey had backed first Mehmet Ali Talat, the former President
of the TRNC and the Turkish Cypriot leader, and then, after the 2008 Turkish Cypriot
presidential elections, it gave its support to Talat’s successor Derviº Eroðlu. Just as the
Turkish Cypriot leadership Turkey blames the Greek Cypriot side for no progress during
the current round of talks. In practice the negotiations were suspended due to presidential
elections in the Republic of Cyprus and the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union in the second half of 2012. It seems that such developments suit both sides.
Nevertheless, the talks are to be resumed in October 2013 (Transcript, 2013).
Baskýn Oran claims that “looking back at a decade of AKP majority rule, it appears
that most of Turkey’s chronic problems have evaded treatment. Domestically, the
Kurdish issue remains far from any resolution. Internationally, next to no progress has
been made on Cyprus or with regards to relations with Armenia and Armenian claims
for genocide recognition” (Oran, 2012, p. xxii). Such observation is true as far as the
Cyprus question is concerned. Despite the more flexible attitude of the AKP dominated
government one cannot observe many positive results. Probably the most noticeable
outcome was the opening of checkpoints on the island in 2003. And that’s it.
No doubt the Cyprus question remains the most important matter of the Turkish for-
eign policy. The best proof is that the dispute tops the main issues of the foreign policy
on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Main, 2013). Besides, the Cy-
prus question is also very important to public opinion. Although Turkey presents the
Cyprus question as an external issue and recognizes the TRNC as a sovereign state,
there is a direct link between developments on the island and political situation in Tur-
key. Hence all Turkish governments, including the current government dominated by
AKP, have to take it into consideration. Every declaration, every concession or decision
are carefully analyzed in order to save the national consensus. As a matter of fact, al-
most all Turkish political parties share the opinion that Cyprus constitutes an element of
the Turkish sphere of influence and that control over it is of vital importance from the
geostrategic point of view. Therefore one can say that the main objectives have been in-
variable since 1974 and there have been only different ideas concerning ways of fulfill-
ing the objectives. As Kývanç Ulusoy claims, “for Turkey, the Cyprus problem has not
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been an ordinary foreign policy issue since its inception. Defined as a ‘national cause’,
it had clear repercussions on the power struggle in Turkey between the parties of status
quo and change in domestic politics and foreign policy” (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 313–314).
The Cyprus Imbroglio: Implications for Turkey
In the 2003 EU Commission Progress Report, “the European Commission has
warned that the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s as-
pirations of starting formal accession talks with the European Union. For the first time
a direct link was established in an EU report between the resolution of the Cyprus prob-
lem and the starting of negotiations with Turkey” (Yýlmaz, 2004, p. 130). As a conse-
quence, Turkey modified its stance on the Cyprus question and supported the Annan
Plan. Although the UN initiative did not come into force, Turkey managed to strengthen
its position and open the accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. Unfortunately, it
was the last good news for Ankara. The talks were proceeding very slowly. Within eight
years both sides provisionally closed only one out of 35 chapters. One of the reasons is
the 2006 decision of the EU which froze talks in eight key areas under negotiation due
to the unsettled Cyprus question and lack of bilateral diplomatic relations between the
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. “Turkey refused to extend the Additional Protocol to
the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus. Turkey did in fact not open ports and airports to Cyp-
riot vessels, because the isolation of northern Cyprus, which the EU was supposed to
ease, continued, despite the Turkish Cypriot yes vote” (Öktem, 2011, p. 140). Hence at
the moment the EU-Turkey accession negotiations depend mainly on the progress in
bi-communal talks and normalization of relations between Turks and the Republic of
Cyprus. The only question is if Turkey was ready to sacrifice Cyprus for the sake of EU
membership. Nowadays it would be very hard to imagine such progress of events. No
Turkish government would take a risk of a complete withdrawal from the island as it is
regarded as a national interest by the majority of citizens. One could even say that for
Turks the Cyprus question has become a kind of affair of honor. Any significant conces-
sions would be interpreted as signs of weakness.
According to Özlem Oðuz Çilsal, Praxoula Kyriacou and Fiona Mullen, “the largest
opportunity, however, comes from opening up Turkey’s potential as an energy hub. As
a direct by-product of the Cyprus problem, Turkey has been unable to open the energy
chapter in its accession negotiations with the EU and this kind of uncertainty deters in-
vestors. On the other hand, a settlement of the Cyprus problem that reunites the island
and brings peace and stability to the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece region would vastly in-
crease foreign interest in the energy sector” (Çilsal, Kyriacou, Mullen, 2010, p. 2). It
should be emphasized, however, that there is no proof that potential investors hesitate
to invest in the Turkish energy sector due to the unsettled Cyprus question. Yet in the fu-
ture Turkey might, for instance, derive money from transit of Cypriot gas. At the mo-
ment it is impossible because of political limitations. But if the Cyprus dispute was
settled, such solution would be mutually desirable and beneficial.
The most difficult consequence for Turkey, however, is connected with a kind of
paradoxical stalemate. On the one hand it is hard to imagine Turkey as an EU member
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state without any prior settlement of the Cyprus question, but on the other hand it is
highly unlikely that the Cyprus dispute will be settled without a prior accession of Tur-
key to the EU. The more time is passing, the worse. Turkish public opinion is less and
less interested in an EU membership for Turkey (Çaha, 2011). Such scenario cannot be
beneficial to any side of the dispute. In the opinion of Ahmet Sözen, “a Turkey slipping
away from the EU will have less motivation to undertake further reforms in the area of
democracy; it will have less incentive to solve the Cyprus problem; and it will fail to be-
come a model of consensus of civilizations” in the post-September 11 era, as well as
a democratic model for the post-Arab Spring Middle Eastern and North African states,
which will be a great loss for the international community at large” (Sözen, 2012, p. 125).
Conclusions
The Cyprus question has been one of the key aspects of the Turkish foreign policy
since the 1950’s. Yet its role became evident after the 1974 events. It was the moment
when Turkey engaged directly in the Cyprus question. Since then all consecutive Turk-
ish governments have been burdened with the Cyprus problem and its bilateral as well
as regional consequences. They have two dimensions, namely internal as well as exter-
nal. The first dimension affects the Turkish political stage, while the second dimension
affects EU-Turkey relations as well as Turkey-TRNC relations and, finally, Turkey-the
Republic of Cyprus relations.
As far as the Turkish tactic on the Cyprus question is concerned, one could observe
a significant change in 2002 when the Peace and Justice Party came into power. Yet the
main aims remained unchanged. The AKP government took a more flexible stand in or-
der to prove its goodwill and improve its bilateral relations with the European Union.
The Greek Cypriot side remained skeptical with reference to the Turkish goodwill, but
the fact is that Ankara was trying to convince Turkish Cypriots to accept the Annan
Plan in 2004 and bring the 30 years old division of the island to an end. Although the
Annan Plan did not come into force due to a resounding ‘no’ of Greek Cypriots, the
Turkish tactic was successful as Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan. As a result, nobody
could accuse Turkey of inaction or obstruction of negotiations anymore. This time it
was the Greek Cypriot side which was to blame. Undoubtedly, the new policy paved the
way for the opening of EU-Turkey negotiations in October 2005.
One can say that the main objectives have been invariable since 1974, there have
been only different ideas concerning ways of fulfilling the objectives. For instance, in
terms of official rhetoric the AKP position is more flexible than the position of CHP, but
what both parties have in common is that they want Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to
gain as much as possible without any serious concessions. The reason is the Cyprus
question still remains the most important issue of the Turkish foreign policy. What’s
more, it is also a national cause with all its impacts on the power struggle in Turkey. No
matter who is in power, there are some concessions which will never be made, e.g.
a complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. As a result, both the European
Union and Greek Cypriots can expect a constructive approach of Turkey to the Cyprus
problem, albeit it has its serious political limitations.
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Summary
The Cyprus question is one of the most complex international disputes, which the Republic
of Turkey has been engaged in since its foundation in 1923. Although Cyprus was conquered by
the Ottoman Empire in 1571, the Turks actually lost control over the island in 1878. British rule
only strengthened ethnic divisions in Cyprus, especially when Cyprus became a Crown Colony
in 1925. After World War II, Greek Cypriots wanted to unite with mainland Greece (enosis),
while Turkish Cypriots promoted the division of the island’s territory between Greece and Tur-
key (taksim). Finally, both sides agreed on the foundation of an independent Cypriot state,
named the Republic of Cyprus, in 1960, and became its guarantors. Yet this was not the end of
the Cyprus question. Lack of mutual trust led to further clashes between the two communities in
1963 and resulted in a disintegration of the state. The most important events, however, took place
in 1974, when Turkey decided to intervene militarily on the island in response to a Greek Cypriot
coup d’état. This paper is devoted to the Turkish position on the Cyprus question after the inter-
vention and division of Cyprus. Has the policy undergone any significant changes since 1974? Is
the Cyprus question a matter of Turkish national interest? The paper compares two periods,
namely that from 1974 to 2002 and after 2002.
Streszczenie
Turcja i jej stanowiska w kwestii Cypru od 1974 roku
Kwestia cypryjska pozostaje jednym z najbardziej z³o¿onych sporów miêdzynarodowych,
w który Republika Turcji jest zaanga¿owana od pocz¹tków swego funkcjonowania, czyli roku
1923. Cypr zosta³ podbity przez Imperium Osmañskie w 1571 roku. Turcy stracili jednak nad
nim faktyczn¹ kontrolê w 1878 roku. Okres brytyjskich rz¹dów przyczyni³ siê do zaostrzenia po-
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dzia³u etnicznego na wyspie, zw³aszcza po tym, gdy w 1925 roku Cypr zosta³ og³oszony koloni¹.
Po II wojnie œwiatowej Greccy Cypryjczycy nadal chcieli doprowadziæ do zjednoczenia z konty-
nentaln¹ Grecj¹ (enosis), podczas gdy Tureccy Cypryjczycy i Turcja opowiadali siê za po-
dzia³em terytorium wyspy pomiêdzy Grecjê i Turcjê (taksim). Ostatecznie obie strony przysta³y
na rozwi¹zanie kompromisowe – utworzenie niepodleg³ej Republiki Cypryjskiej w 1960 roku.
Grecja i Turcja sta³y siê wówczas pañstwami gwarantami ³adu konstytucyjnego na wyspie. Jed-
nak¿e, jak siê mia³o wkrótce okazaæ, przyjête rozwi¹zania nie oznacza³y koñca problemu. Deficyt
wzajemnego zaufania doprowadzi³ do staræ pomiêdzy cz³onkami obu cypryjskich spo³ecznoœci
i, bêd¹cej ich konsekwencj¹, faktycznej dezintegracji pañstwa w 1963 roku. Niemniej, najistot-
niejsze wydarzenia mia³y miejsce w roku 1974, gdy turecki rz¹d podj¹³ decyzjê o przeprowadzeniu
interwencji zbrojnej w odpowiedzi na prawicowy zamach stanu. Niniejszy artyku³ poœwiêcony
jest stanowisku Turcji w sprawie Cypru w okresie po interwencji i w warunkach faktycznego po-
dzia³u wyspy na dwa pañstwa. Czy po 1974 roku stanowisko Turcji ulega³o znacz¹cym modyfi-
kacjom? Czy kwestia cypryjska stanowi turecki interes narodowy? Podstawê analizy stanowi
podzia³ i porównanie polityki tureckiej w dwóch okresach: 1974–2002 oraz po 2002 roku.
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